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Abstract— This paper focuses on the question of the 
transfer  efficiency  of  the  SFP  scheme  and  represents 
graphically the results of an analytical framework with 
the seminal Surplus Transformation Curve initiated by 
Josling  (1974)  and  developed  by  Gardner  (1983).  The 
special feature of the SFP scheme resides in the paradox 
that  exists  between  the  tradability  of  the  entitlements 
and  the  activation  constraint  that  creates  a  particular 
link to the land. The main result is that redistributive 
effects between landowners and farmers depend on the 
total  number  of  entitlements,  so  they  have  to  be 
considered as a lever to increase the transfer efficiency 
of the scheme. 
Keywords— Single Farm Payment, transfer efficiency, 
surplus transformation curve. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In accordance with the principle of decoupling, the last 
2003  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  reform 
introduced a new way to distribute subsidies to farmers. The 
eligibility for payments is no longer relative to the number 
of farmed hectares or heads of cattle but relies on a tradable 
entitlement  scheme  which  gives  access  to  subsidies:  the 
Single Farm Payment (SFP) scheme. Although production 
is  no  longer  required  to  get  the  payment  attached  to 
entitlements,  the  SFP’s  owner  has  to  “activate”  his 
entitlements  by  keeping  in  good  agricultural  and 
environmental conditions (GAEC) as many eligible hectares 
as  SFP  entitlements  he  owns  in  order  to  receive  the 
dedicated  payments.  The  so-called  "activation  constraint" 
acts as a specific link between the SFP and the land which 
keeps  the  SFP  inside  farming  sector  and  makes  them 
different from both a simple bond scheme and the previous 
direct area payments system. The special feature of the SFP 
scheme  resides  in  the  paradox  that  exists  between  the 
tradability of the entitlements and the activation constraint. 
On  the  one  hand,  compared  with  area  payments  the 
tradability  offers  an  autonomy  to  the  right  of  access  to 
subsidies  from  the  land.  But  on  the  other  hand,  without 
eligible hectares the SFP entitlements are worth nothing.   
The objective of this paper is to focus on the question of 
the transfer efficiency of the SFP scheme and to represent 
graphically the results of our model in terms of landowners 
and producers surplus by taking up a framework initiated by 
Josling  (1974)  [1],  developed  by  Gardner  (1983)  [2]  and 
generalized by Bullock et al. (1999) [3] and Bullock and 
Salhofer  (2003)  [4].  This  framework  aims  at  mapping 
agricultural policies in three different spaces :  
·  the  “policy  instrument  space”  where  policies  are 
depicted as sets of elementary instruments ;  
·  the  “welfare  outcome  space”  where  policies  are 
presented according to their effects on the welfare   2 
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of groups in the form of a Surplus Transformation 
Curves (STC) ;  
·  and between these two spaces, the ‘price-quantity 
space’ offers a representation of the  economy that 
allows  to  translate  the  policies  into  surplus 
variations for the different groups.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second 
section presents a model of the SFP scheme. The third one 
takes  up  the  seminal  Josling’s  framework  in  the  current 
context  of  the  shift  from  area  payment  program  to  more 
decoupled entitlement scheme. The last one concludes.     
II. A MODEL OF THE SINGLE FARM PAYMENT 
SCHEME 
The  benchmark  :  farmers’  behaviour  in  an  area 
subsidy regime 
Basically, the impact of an area subsidy is modelled as 
fallows. First of all, a restricted profit function is defined for 
each producer i  :  
(1)  [ ] ) , ( ; ) , , (
,
i i i i i
x y
i i h x f y wx py Max h w p
i i
= - = p   
where  p  is the output price,  i y  is the output level,  i x  
is the vector of input quantities other than land,  w is the 
vector of input prices,   i h  is the land quantity,  ) , ( i i i h x f  
is a well-behaved production function. 
Without policy, the agent seeks to maximise his profit by 
renting in the optimal number of hectares, with  r  as the 
land rental price:   
(2)    i i i
h
rh h w p Max
i
- ) , , ( p ) , , ( r w pi i q º  
By differentiation of the program (2) with respect to the 
land rental price, an expression of the land demand function 
for agent i  is obtained (Hotelling’s lemma): 
 (3)  r r w p r w p h i i ¶ -¶ = / ) , , ( ) , , ( q  
The  land  market  equilibrium  is  defined  by  equating 
farmers’ land demands to land supply:   
(4)  ) ( ) ( ) , , (
wp wp wp
i r S r D r w p h = º ∑  
For convenience  ) (r D  is used for the aggregate land 
demand and  ) (r S  is the land supply function to the farm 
sector by landowners,  with  0 / ) ( ³ ¶ ¶ r r S . Equation (4) 
solved for  r  defines the equilibrium land rental price 
wp r  
as a function of output and variable input prices.  
 
With an area payment program that offers the amount a  
for each hectare, the agent’s program becomes: 
(5)   i i i i
h
ah rh h w p Max
i
+ - ) , , ( p  
This program (5) defines a similar profit function than 
the previous case without policy,    ) , , ( a r w pi i - q , and a 
similar land demand function  ) , , ( a r w p hi - . In the same   3 
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way,  the  land  market  equilibrium  is  thus  defined  by  the 
equation (6) : 
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Fig. 1 : Land market equilibrium with an area subsidy 
program 
The  area  subsidy  program  moves  up  the  inverse 
aggregate land demand from  ) (
1 H D
-  to  a H D +
- ) (
1 . 
This shift increases both the area devoted to a  farm use, 
from 
wp H  to  ) (
max a H , and the land rental price, from 
wp r  to 
a r . Moreover, it appears that the less elastic land 
supply  is,  the  less  the  farmed  area  rises,  the  more  price 
increases.  
 
Once  the  market  equilibrium  characteristics  stated, 
redistributive  effects  of  the  policy  may  be  shown  up  by 
using  Marshallian  surplus  as  a  measure  of  the  agents’ 
welfare
1. Defining three groups of agents, the landowners, 
the  producers  and  the  taxpayers,  the  variation  of  their 
welfare  are  expressed  analytically  and  graphically  as 
follows:    
wp wp
a H
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It appears that the landowners take the lion’s share of the 
benefit  from  this  kind  of  support.  The  variation  of 
producers’  surplus  is  positive  since  a r r
wp a < -   for  a 
land supply not totally inelastic. But the more inelastic the 
land supply is, the less the producers’ surplus varies. Thus 
the policy induces a social welfare loss equals to the area f.  
 
Agricultural producers’ behaviour in the SFP regime 
In the SFP policy regime, each producer i  maximizes his 
profit by optimising his number of hectares and his number 
of entitlements. We keep the assumption that he rents in all 
                                                            
1  For  the  discussion  about  the  drawbacks  of  the  Marshallian 
surplus in welfare analysis due to the fact that they are not utility-
constant, we could not add anything better than Gardner (1987) 
Chap. 7.      4 
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the  land  from  landowners  and  we  assume  that  he  could 
exchange entitlements that are initially endowed to farmers. 
His profit program is expressed as follows:   
(7)    ) ( ) , , (
0
,
i i i i i i
n h
n n v bn rh h w p Max
i i
- - + - p  
     s.t.   i i h n £ £ 0  ;   N ni £  
with  b  the face value of payment entitlements,  i n  the 
number  of  entitlements  for  farmer  i , 
0
i n   the  initial 
endowment in entitlements for farmer i , v  the rental price 
of  entitlements  and  N   the  total  number  of  entitlements. 
The difference  ) (
0
i i n n v -  represents thus either the costs 
of  renting  in,  or  the  earnings  of  renting  out,  additional 
payments at a price v  per unit.  
 
The inequality constraint  i i h n £  captures the fact that 
payments are granted only  for entitlements  for  which the 
farmer  holds  an  eligible  hectare,  i.e.,  the  activation 
constraint.  
From program (7), we define first-order conditions and 
the exclusion conditions for program with l , m  and g  as 
the  multipliers  associated  with  the  inequality  constraints 
i n £ 0 ,  i i h n £  and  N ni £ : 
(8a)  0 / ) ( = + - ¶ ¶ l p r h hi i  
(8b)  0 = - - + - g l m v b  
(8c)  0 = i n m  
(8d)  0 ) ( = - i i n h l  
(8e)  0 ) ( = - i n N g  
System (8a) to (8e) defines agent’s demands for land and 
for entitlements with respect to land and entitlement rental 
price.    
(i)  For  b v > . Under this assumption,  0 > m  (from 
8b),  0 = i n  (from 8c),  0 = l  (from 8d)
2 and 
r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  (from 8a).  
(ii) For  b v = .  Under  this  assumption, 
0 = = = g l m   (from  8b,  8c,  8d  and  8e), 
r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  (from 8a) and  i i h n £ £ 0 .  
(iii) For  b v < .  Under  this  assumption, 
0 ³ > + m g l   (from  8b).  Three  sub  cases 
appear  depending  on  what  constraint  is 
binding first between  i i h n £  and  N ni £  :    
a)  0 > l   and  0 = g   thus 
b v r h hi i - + = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p   (from  8a  and 
8b) and  N h n i i £ =  (from 8d and 8e); 
                                                            
2 The analysis excludes the uninteresting (unrealistic) case where 
the  land  rental  price  is  “sufficiently”  high  so  that  the  marginal 
profit of the first hectare is lower than the land rental price. 
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b)  0 > l   and  0 > g   thus 
g p + - + = ¶ ¶ b v r h hi i / ) (     (from  8a 
and 8b) and  N h n i i = =  (from 8d and 
8e); 
c)  0 = l   and  0 > g   thus 
r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p   (from  8a)  and 
N n h i i = ³  (from 8d and 8e). 
From  this  analysis,  one  can  thus  implicitly  define  the 
land  demand  function  and  the  entitlement  net  demand 
function for farmer i  as follows: 
(9)  when  b v > ,  r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  and  0 = i n . 
(10)  when  b v = ,  r h hi i = ¶ ¶ / ) ( p  and  i i h n £ £ 0 , 
(11)  when  b v < ,    land  and  entitlement  demands 
depend on the relative values of   r  and  N  as graphically 
represented as follows : 
2
i h N =  
r 
1 r  
2 r  
3 r  
1
i h  
3








hi i - +
¶
¶ ) ( p  
H  
 
Fig. 2 : Demand for land when v < b with respect to the 
total number of entitlements, N,  
for three different values of land rental price 
 
The demand for land when the entitlement price is less 
than the face value of the entitlements is represented in the 
shape of 3-part kinked curve. 
(11a)  for relative high land rental prices, for instance  1 r , 
the  demand  for  land  is  defined  by   
b v r h hi i - + = ¶ ¶ / ) (
1 p   and  entitlement  net  demand  is 
N h n i i £ = ;  
(11b)   for relative medium land rental prices, for instance 
2 r , the demand for land and the net demand for entitlement 
are the same  N n h i i = =
2 ; 
(11c)  for relative low land rental prices, for instance  3 r , 
the demand for land is defined by  3
3 / ) ( r h hi i = ¶ ¶p  and 
entitlement net demand is binding 
3
i i h N n < = . 
 
So, the total number of entitlements and the number of 
entitlements held by the agent modify his demand for land, 
) , , , , ( N v b r w p hi - . The curve is kinked at the abscise N 
and while staying continuous the left part is moved up by 
the distance  v b- .    
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Land and entitlement market equilibriums 
We  now  establish  the  conditions  for  a  simultaneous 
equilibrium on land and entitlement markets. In doing so, 
the  land  demands  of  all  the  agents  are  aggregated  and 
confronted  to  a  land  supply  function.  Considering  that 
entitlement demands are net demands, their aggregation are 
confronted  to  the  total  number  of  entitlements.  As  a 
consequence, if the aggregate net demand for entitlements, 
whatever the entitlement price, is strictly less than the total 
number  of  entitlements,  the  market-clearing  condition 
impose that the price is zero.     
(12) ∑ = - º - ) ( ) , , ( ) , , , , ( r L N v b r D N v b r w p hi  
(13a) ∑ £ N ni  
(13b)   If   v "  we have ∑ < N ni  thus   0 = v   
 
Three  regimes  have  to  be  distinguished  depending  on 
wp H N £ ,  ) (
max b H N H
wp < <   or  N b H £ ) (
max  
where 
wp H   is  total  agricultural  land  used  in  the  zero 
support situation, i.e. 
wp wp wp
i H r L r w p h = = ∑ ) ( ) , , ( , 
and  ) (
max b H   is  the  number  of  hectares  that  would  be 
demanded in a support regime of per-hectare direct aids of 
unit  amount  equal  to  the  entitlement  face  value, 
) ( ) ( ) , , (
max b H r L b r w p h
b b
i = = - ∑ . 
 
Regime 1. 
wp H N £  
One  then  shows  that  equilibrium  conditions  may  be 
defined as : 
(14a) 
wp r r = *  
(14b) 
wp wp wp
i H r L r w p h H = = =∑ ) ( ) , , ( *  




i i H h N n = £ = ∑ ∑
* *  
) (
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wp H  










c  e 
b  
N  
Figure 3 : Land market equilibrium when 
wp H N £  
 
Proposition  1.  When 
wp H N £ ,  introducing  tradable 
SFP  entitlements  has  no  impact  on  the  land  market:  the 
farmers’ land demands, the land rental price and the total 
agricultural  area  are  unchanged.  The  SFP  scheme  is 
decoupled at the extensive margin of production and there is 
no capitalization of entitlements into land prices.  
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Regime 2.  ) (
max b H N H
wp < <  
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Fig. 4 : Land market equilibrium 
when  ) (
max b H N H
wp < <  
 
In that case equilibrium conditions may be written as : 
(15a)   
b wp r r r < < *  
(15b)
wp
i H N v b r L v b r w p h H > = + - = + - =∑ *) * ( *) * , , ( *  
(15c)  b v < <
* 0  
(15d)  ∑ ∑ ∑ > = =
wp
i i i h h N n
* *  
Proposition 2. When  ) (
max b H N H
wp < < , then the 
SFP  scheme  is  not  decoupled  at  the  extensive  margin  of 
production and is partly capitalized into land rental price. 
The higher the number of entitlements, the higher the effect 
on land used in the farm sector, the higher the land rental 
price and the capitalization into land rental prices, and the 
lower the entitlement price.  
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wp r  
wp H  
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Fig. 5 : Land market equilibrium  
when  N b H £ ) (
max  
 
In that case equilibrium conditions are defined by: 
(16a) 
b r r = *  
(16b)
  ) ( ) * ( ) * , , ( *
max b H b r L b r w p h H i = - = - =∑  
(16c)  0
* = v  
(16d)  N h n i i ∑ ∑ £ =
* *  
Proposition  3.  When  N b H £ ) (
max ,  then  the  SFP 
scheme acts as an area payment program. Thus the farmers’ 
land demands, the land rental price and the total agricultural 
area are the same than with an area payment program of an 
amount of b per hectare. In this case, the SFP scheme is 
coupled  to  the  land  and  a  large  part  of  the  support  is 
capitalized in land rental price. All of the entitlements are   8 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
not  activated,  their  relative  abundance  induces  that  their 
value is zero.    
 
To conclude this section, we show that the link between 
land and entitlements induced by the activation constraint 
differs  largely  from  the  link  between  land  and  area 
payments.  Moreover,  it  appears  that  the  degree  of 
capitalization of the SFP support into the land rental price 
can be zero, partial or total depending on the  scarcity of 
entitlements relative to the number of hectares and on the 
land supply elasticity. Thus, the total number of entitlement 
has  to  be  considered  as  a  lever  to  improve  the  transfer 
efficiency of the income support to farmers. That’s what we 
map on the next section.    
III. MAPPING THE DECOUPLING 
In this section we recycle the initial framework initiated 
by Josling (1974) [1] in the context of the decoupling of 
area payments and their conversion into SFP entitlements 
by  focusing  on  the  transfer  efficiency  and  redistribution 
effects between producers and landowners.  
 
The policy instrument space 
We decompose the two major European income support 
policies  in  a  continuous  set  of  area  payments  and  SFP 
scheme, with respect to a ceiling budget constraint.  
Let us introduce the two ‘decoupling variables’. First of 
all, t is the coupling rate ( 1 0 £ £t ), i.e., the share of the 
budget devoted to the area payment program. And secondly, 
N  is the total number of SFP entitlements.  
We define  ) (A W  as the continuous set of policies  X  
with respect to A, the ceiling budget : 
    { } ) , , ( ) ( N t A X A = W  
Each policy is defined as a mix between two instruments  
-  an  area  payment  program  ) ( 1 a x   with    a  the 
payment amount for an hectare ; 
-  - a SFP scheme  ) ; ( 2 N b x  with b the face value of 
the SFP entitlements and  N  the total number of 
SFP entitlements. 
The  ceiling  budget  leads  to  the  following  relation  : 
bN aH A + = .  With  H  the  total  number  of  hectares 
demanded by all the farmers, any policy j can therefore be 















x N t A X     
So, the policy instrument space could now be presented 
in the following figure with the two decoupling variables  t  
and  N .   
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Fig. 6 : the policy instrument space  ) (A W  
 
The total number of entitlements has no upper value, the 
set  ) (A W   is  infinite.  Two  particular  values  of  N  are 
distinguished,    )) 0 , 1 , ( (
1 max A X H H =   is  the  total  area 
demanded  for  a  fully  coupled  policy  and 
wp H = )) 0 , 0 , 0 ( (
0 X H  is the total demanded area in a no 
support regime.  
 
The price-quantity space 
Instead of the output market in Josling (1974)’s seminal 
paper,  the  instruments  that  we  study  here  bring  us  to 
consider  the  land  input  market.  By  referring  to  what  has 
been developed in the previous section, the demand for land 
of  the  agent  i  under  ) , , ( N t A X   is  








) 1 ( -
=   and 















1 r  
wp r  
max H  
wp H  
3 r  
3 1 ) ( a H D +
-  















b - > =  
Fig. 7 : the price-quantity space affected 




max 3 H N H A X
wp < <  
 
In figure 7, the land market equilibrium is presented in 
the case of a partially coupled policy where the total number 
of  entitlements  lies  between 
wp H   and 





max 3 H N H A X
wp < < . 
At equilibrium, the land rental price and the total number 
of  demanded  hectares  are  respectively 
3 r   and 
3 H .  The 
aggregated land demand is represented as a 3-part kinked 
curve. The first segment (quoted 1 in the figure 7) is merged 
with the straight line 
3 3 1 ) ( b a H D + +
- . For a number of 




max H  
wp H  
1 
) 0 , 1 , (
1 A X  
) , 0 , (
max 2 H N A X =  
) 0 , 0 , 0 (
wp X  
) (A W    10 
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entitlements,  the  land  demand  is  moved  up  from  the 
distance 
3 3 b a +  which corresponds to the sum of the area 
payment amount by hectare and the face value of the SFP 
entitlements. In this case, we notice that 





a =  because of the “concentration effect” due 
to a total number of entitlements lesser than 
max H . At the 
opposite, in the situation where N is greater than 
max H , the 
face  value  of  the  entitlement  suffers  from  a  “dilution 
effect”, because the same amount would have been shared 
in a larger number of entitlements because of the ceiling 
budget. This dilution (concentration) effect brings about a 
drop (rise) of the first segment of the land demand curve. 
Moreover,  an  other  effect  of  the  variations  of  N   is  the 
translation of the segment 2 of the aggregate land demand : 
when  N  increases (decreases) then the segment 2 moves to 
the right (left).  
When t rises (decreases) 
3 a  increases (decreases) and  
3 b  decreases (increases). Graphically, when t rises the first 
segment moves down and the third one moves up.  
 
The welfare outcome space  
From  the  land  market  equilibrium,  we  should  now 
translate  ) (A W  in terms of variation of producer surplus, 
PS D ,  and  variation  of  landowner  surplus  LS D .  To 
distinguish the proper effects of each decoupling variable, 
we  adopt  a  two-step  procedure.  Firstly,  we  focus  on  N  
while  considering  0 = t .  And  secondly  the  impacts  of 
variable t  on the surplus of the two groups are shown.  
 
To discuss welfare implications of variations of N,  we 
use graphic support for the three regimes identified in the 
previous section. In figure 8,  welfare outcomes of a SFP 
scheme where 
wp H N £  are highlighted.  
We  have  shown  before  that  in  those  cases  the  SFP 
scheme  has  no  effect  on  the  land  market.  Therefore,  it 
appears that the landowner’s surplus are not affected by the 
policy. Thus, the farmers are the only beneficiaries of the 
policy  ) , 0 , (











2 r  
wp r r =
4  
max H  






4 1 ) ( b H D +
-  
N  
Fig. 8 : Welfare outcomes of policy  ) , 0 , (
4 wp H N A X £  
 
Then, because of the concentration effect that increases 
the  face  value  of  the  entitlements  and  because  the  land   11 
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allocation is not affected, the transfer efficiency of the SFP 
scheme is perfect when












2 r  
wp r  










5 r  
Fig. 9 : Welfare outcomes of policy 
) , 0 , (
max 5 H N H A X
wp < <  
 
When  the  total  number  of  entitlements  lies  between 
wp H  and 
max H , an increase of N  induces a decrease of 
farmers’  welfare  and  an  increase  of  landowners’  one, 
because of the rise of the land rental price. The area h  is 
the  deadweight  loss  associated  with  the  policy 
) , 0 , (
max 5 H N H A X
wp < < .  The  closer  to 
wp H   the 
total  number  of  entitlements  is,  the  thinner  the 














2 r  
wp r  






6 1 ) ( b H D +
-  
6 H  







mzx -  
Fig. 10 : Welfare outcomes of policy 
) , 0 , (
max 6 H N A X >  
 
The dilution effect induced by 
max H N >  results in the 
relation  w f m c y + = + + . Both the landowners and the 
farmers suffer from the dilution effect because, in the one 
hand, weaker face values reduce demand for land and, in the 
other,  because  many  entitlements  (
6 H N - )  can  not  be 
activated.  Without  loss  of  generality,  we  indeed  consider 
that  non  activated  entitlements  are  not  given  back  to  the 
taxpayers
3.  In  the  extreme,  when  the  total  number  of 
entitlements tends to infinity, the face value tends to zero, 
and the welfares of landowners and farmers are those of a 
non support regime. 
From  these  developments,  we  now  build  the  surplus 
transformation  curve  (STC)  associated  to  the  ‘decoupling 
variable’ N.      
                                                            
3 This is for instance what happens when a Member State see his 
net budget return be affected by a misuse of the Community funds 
allocated to it. From this point of view, non activated entitlements 
are a loss.    12 
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Fig. 11 : the welfare outcome space for a pure SFP 
scheme (t = 0) 
 
The coordinates of each point of the STC are the value of 
the welfare of the landowners and the farmers for a specific 
value of the total number of entitlements. The higher part of 
the STC corresponds to the lowest values of N, and vice-
versa.    The  ceiling  budget  constraint  is  represented  by  a 
straight line of ordinate at the origin A and of slope equals 
to -1. Thus the losses due to both the misallocation of the 
land and the non activated entitlements are a function of the 
distance  between  each  point  of  the  STC  and  the  ceiling 
budget line.  
 
We now include in the welfare analysis the impacts of 
the second decoupling variable, t, the budget share devoted 
to the area payment program. In doing so, we refer to the 
figure 7. First of all, we have seen that a pure SFP scheme 
with 
max H N =   is  equivalent  to  a  pure  area  payment 
policy. Thus for  1 = t  we have the following relationship:  
) , 0 , ( ) 0 , 1 , (
max 2 1 H A X A X º  
Considering  the  cases  where  ] [ 1 ; 0 Î t ,  we  show  on 
figure 7 that the area payment instrument acts as a floor for 
the land rental price and the number of demanded hectares. 
As a result, this floor reduces the welfare transfers allowed 
by  variations  of  the  total  number  of  entitlements.  These 
floor values are encountered for both low and high values of 
the total number of entitlements. The lowest ones are for a 
total  number  of  entitlements  less  than  the  number  of 
hectares demanded for a pure area payment policy with a 
total budget limited to  tA. Under this minimum, policies 
have similar effects : when  )) 0 , 1 , ( ( tA X H N £  we have 
))) 0 , 1 , ( ( , , ( ))) 0 , 1 , ( ( , , ( tA X H N t A X tA X H N t A X = º <
. 
The highest ones are for the extreme values of N, i.e., 
when N tends to infinity. In this (hypothetical) case, this 
policy has similar effects to a pure payment policy with a 
restricted  budget  of  tA  :  when  ¥ ® N ,  we  have 
) 0 , 1 , ( ) , , ( tA X N t A X º .  Thus  for  any  given  t,  the 
landowner surpluses are the same when the number of SFP 
is less than or equal to  )) 0 , 1 , ( ( tA X H  or tends to infinity, 
because for this values the land rental price and the total 
number of demanded hectares do not change.    13 
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    For the intermediate value of N, it appears that where 
[ ]
max ); 0 , 1 , ( ( H tA X H N Î , the land market equilibrium 
is not affected by the coupling part of the policy : 
[ ]) ); 0 , 1 , ( ( , , (
max H tA X H N t A X Î   
         [ ]) ); 0 , 1 , ( ( , 0 , (




)) 0 , 1 , ( ( , , ( tA X H N t A X £  
) 0 , 0 , 0 (
0 X  
) 0 , 1 , ( ) , 0 , (
1 max 2 A X H N A X = =  
)) ) 0 , 1 , ( ( , , ( )) ) 0 , 1 , ( ( , 0 , (
max max H N tA X H t A X H N tA X H A X < < = < <  
) , 0 , ( ) , 0 , (
4 wp wp H N A X H N A X = º <  
PS D  
) 0 , 1 , ( ) , , ( tA X N t A X º ¥ ®
¥  
Ceiling budget line 
STC(t) 
Censorship line (t) 
1 ® t   t ¬ 0  
N  
¥  LS D  
Fig. 12 : the welfare outcome space for a  
non pure SFP scheme ( ] ] 1 ; 0 Î t ) 
 
By building the STC for  ] ] 1 ; 0 Î t , we find out that it is 
merged  with  the  STC  ( 0 = t )  on  the  right  of  a  vertical 
straight  line  of  abscise  equals  to  landowners’  surplus 
variation  for  a  pure  area  payment  program  of  a  budget 
restricted to tA. In fact, t acts as a censorship of the STC. 
Finally,  the  variation  of  the  coupling  rate  does  not  offer 
opportunities to increase the transfer efficiency. It just limits 
the redistribution possibilities by censoring the STC.   
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS   
The analytic framework presented in this paper allows us 
to  discuss  the  transfer  efficiency  and  the  redistribution 
effects of the SFP scheme. The main result is that the SFP 
scheme is able to attain the optimal transfer efficiency of the 
theoretical  lump  sum  transfer  in  spite  of  the  activation 
constraint  that  creates  a  particular  link  between  the 
entitlements  and  the  land.  Indeed,  we  found  out  that  the 
transfer efficiency of the SFP scheme reaches its peak when 
the total number of SFP is less than or equal to the total 
number of hectares that would be demanded in a no support 
regime.  Thus  the  total  number  of  entitlements  has  to  be 
considered as a lever to increase the transfer efficiency of 
the scheme. Because each Member State of the former EU-
15 has implemented his own SFP scheme, the impacts of 
the  last  CAP  reform  could  largely  differ  among  them.  
Nevertheless  complete  impact  assessments  of  the  reform 
have to pay attention to land regulations that exist in most 
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